

# The Ukraine crisis and EU SoS

## Overview of Stress Test modelling by ENTSOG

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**Disruptions would have a regional impact on Europe -  
mitigation needs a cooperative approach**

**Worse case scenarios (e.g. long disruption during a cold winter)  
would affect nearly all EU countries –  
but still cooperation is the best way to face it**



## Legal notice



*ENTSOG has prepared this analysis at European Commission request in good faith and has endeavoured to prepare this document in a manner which is, as far as reasonably possible, objective, using information collected and compiled by ENTSOG from its members, Member States and stakeholders together with focus on gas infrastructures as enablers for crisis mitigation.*

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# Background



## ***Winter Risk Assessment 2014/15***

- > Analysis of possible consequences of crisis scenarios defined by EC
- > Main conclusions presented to May 2014 Madrid Forum:
  - Ukraine disruption has regional impact on countries from HU to GR
  - Russian disruption has further impact on Baltic region
  - A relative low level of storage at the beginning of the winter could induce additional disruptions as far as North-West Europe and Italy

## ***EC asks ENTSOG to support Stress Test***

- > Member States' Stress Test based on scenarios defined by EC
- > ENTSOG – supported by GIE – added top down perspective
- > Member States interaction managed via EC and Gas Coordination Group
- > Final report submitted to EC on 24 September 2014

# Scenarios considered by ENTSOG

## ***Main parameters defined by European Commission***

- > Disruptions:
  - All Russian supply or transit through Ukraine
  - September to February period or February
- > Average climatic conditions plus possible Cold Spell early February
- > Reverse transit from Slovakia to Ukraine and exit from Romania to Moldova
- > Full availability of OPAL or limitation to 50% of the capacity

## ***Data used in the analysis***

- > Monthly demand per balancing zone: average forecast for Winter Supply Outlook 2013/14 unless update by TSO or Member States
- > Imports capped at the average level which on the Dec. 2012 – Feb. 2013 reference period (Dec. 2013 – Feb. 2014) for Algeria

*Results are not a forecast of disruption or any crisis management but the output of a modelling approach to a set of input data*



# Crisis management by market & institutions

## Definition of 2 modelling approaches (e.g. 6-month RU disruption)

### > Optimal crisis management



- Price-responsive market functioning
- Perfect cooperation between Member States

→ *Disruption spread among a maximum of countries in order to reduce relative impact*

### > Sub-optimal crisis management

- Price-responsive market functioning
- Member States export gas only if own demand completely satisfied

→ *Disruption focused on limited number of countries but with higher relative impact*







# Ukraine disruption – Demand disruption

## *Potential impact under different scenarios*

- > Impact on South-East Europe is the same as under Russian disruption
- > Limitation of flows through OPAL may not impact the amount of disrupted demand but will require even more LNG to compensate the Ukraine transit
- > Regional production, storage and LNG will not take full benefit of existing interconnections in case of sub-optimal crisis management

### Maps of February

<10%

10-20%

20-60%

60-80%


90-100%



**1-month optimal**  
9 TWh




**6-month optimal**  
55 TWh



**6-month sub-optimal**  
55 TWh




# Ukraine disruption - Gas supply mix



### Reference Case from Sept. to Mar.


	TWh		TWh
DZ	155	LNG	268
LY	37	TR	8
NO	644	NP	1087
RU	863	UGS	709

**LNG: +0%**  
**UGS: +3%**




**1-month OPAL 100% opt.**

**LNG: +16%**   **UGS: +3%**



**6-month OPAL 100% opt.**

**LNG: +27%**  
**UGS: +3%**



**6-month OPAL 50% opt.**





# Russian disruption – Demand disruption

## *Potential impact under different scenarios*

- > A February disruption has impact on Baltic region and far South-East of Europe
- > September to February: regional impact extends to Hungary, Serbia and Bosnia
- > Cold Spell: additionally impacted countries from Sweden down to Italy

### Maps of February


<10%

10-20%


20-60%

60-80%


90-100%



**1-month optimal**  
17 TWh




**6-month optimal**  
95 TWh



**6-month Cold Spell opt.**  
105 TWh



# Russian disruption - Gas supply mix




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
**LNG: +12%**  
**UGS: +3%**

**LNG: +89%**    **UGS: +29%**


**LNG: +129%**  
**UGS: +29%**



### 1-month optimal



### 6-month optimal



### 6-month with cold spell opt.



# Conclusions



**South-East Europe** still **strongly exposed** to disruption of transit through Ukraine as well as the Baltics if disruption extended to all Russian supplies.

**Efficient use of gas infrastructures** in mitigating such disruption **depends on**

- > ability of impacted countries to send price signals to attract gas and
- > on the cooperation between Member States:

→ ***“C” like Cooperation, Common Interest and Complete implementation of regulation***

Strong adaptability of Central and Western Europe gas supply mix (**UGS / LNG imports**)

- > able to send gas to impacted regions within existing infrastructures **but**
- > at the **expense of a strong gas price increase.**

**Importance of demand-side response** in the further mitigation of the crisis  
(not covered in this analysis)



# Thank You for Your Attention

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